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TAX DEDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE




Two things in life are certain: enormous hazardous waste cleanup
costs and taxes. Despite the obvious significance of the tax conse-
quences of the billions of dollars in cleanup costs spent in the
United States,' the federal tax treatment of these costs remains
uncertain.2 Perhaps the most basic question-whether cleanup ex-
penses may be immediately deducted or must be capitalized-re-
mains an issue that the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has been
unable to resolve.
In the past few years, the IRS has issued a series of contro-
versial opinions that have given little clear guidance on the proper
tax treatment of cleanup costs. In several Technical Advice Memo-
randa ("TAM") issued in 1992 and 1993, the IRS suggested that
most cleanup costs would not be deductible as ordinary expenses. 3
In 1994, however, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 94-38, which
held that expenses incurred by a taxpayer to clean up its own
property contaminated in the course of its business activities were
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1. The Administrator of the EPA has estimated that approximately $30 billion has
been spent under CERCLA to clean up hazardous waste sites. Superfund Program (Part
I): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and Hazardous Materials of the House
Comm. on Energy and Com., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 470, 479-80 (1993) (statement of Carol
M. Browner, Administrator, EPA) cited in Linly Ferris & David Rees, CERCLA Remedy
Selection: Abandoning the Quick Fix Mentality, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 785, 787 (1994).
2. There have been a number of articles by tax commentators addressing issues in
this complex area. See, e.g., Thomas H. Yancey, Emerging Doctrines in the Tax Treatment
of Environmental Cleanup Costs, 70 TAXES 948 (Dec. 1992); Eric R. Fox & Michael F.
Solomon, Who Incurs Environmental Clean-Up Costs-And Why--May Determine Deduc-
tibility, 76 J. TAX'N 12 (1992); Philip J. Holthouse & Benjamin H. Shiao, Deductibility
of Toxic Abatement Costs: The News Improves, 22 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 35 (1994).
3. See infra part IV.A.
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generally deductible as ordinary expenses.4 The ruling, although
limited in scope and sparse in logic or analysis, was hailed by some
as an indication that the IRS would generally give favorable tax
treatment to cleanup costs. 5 Revenue Ruling 94-38 addressed a
relatively simple situation, however, and its logic (or lack thereof)
gave little guidance on how the IRS would deal with more complex
situations. In a TAM issued in 1995, the IRS apparently reversed
course once again, and it now appears to be stating that most
cleanup costs (including the investigation and legal fees associated
with a cleanup) cannot be deducted.
6
The IRS continues to struggle with the problem,7 and, as dis-
cussed below, analysis of the current tax treatment of the most
common types of remediation expenses produces no clear answers.
In analyzing the same set of facts, the IRS and taxpayers can
legitimately reach conflicting conclusions.
Perhaps the basic problem is that traditional tests used to
distinguish capital expenditures from ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses are inappropriate for environmental remediation ex-
penses. It makes little sense to ask whether remediation, essentially
the cleaning up of dirt, is more like a "repair" or an "improve-
ment." The current approach of the IRS not only creates uncer-
tainty and complicates tax planning, but also has the potential to
perversely influence the selection of cleanup standards and tech-
nology based upon an inappropriate consideration of tax conse-
quences. The IRS, in attempting to apply traditional tax analysis
to the complex requirements of environmental remediation, may be
making both bad tax policy and bad environmental policy.
4. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-25 I.R.B. 4.
5. See, e.g., 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 309 (June 17, 1994).
6. See infra Author's Note following Conclusion.
7. The IRS has appointed a task force to develop approaches to tax treatment of
environmental expenditures. See 59 TAX NOTES 1408 (November 15, 1993). To date,
however, there have been no general policies adopted by the IRS and no indication of
when additional clarification will be provided. In 1993, the Subcommittee held hearings
in which, among other things, it considered a proposal to require capitalization of
remediation expenses. During the hearings, the Assistant Treasury Secretary took no
position on the proposal but stated that the Treasury Department was studying the issue.
See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Conln. on
Ways and Means, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (statement of Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant
Secretary (Tax Policy) Department of Treasury). See infra note 181.
Additionally, the Emerging Issues Task Force ("EITF") of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board has sought to provide general recommendations for the tax treatment of
remediation expenses. The EITF has generally recommended that such expenses should
be deductible. See infra discussion at note 201.
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This Article proposes that either the IRS, through regulation,
or Congress, by amendment of the Internal Revenue Code, author-
ize the deduction as ordinary expenses of costs that are incurred
pursuant to federal or state environmental laws, including the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act ("CERCLA"). 8 Despite its imperfections, this solution would
provide taxpayers with some certainty and would ensure that ap-
propriate environmental decisions are made without regard to tax
consequences.
II. BASIC ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS IN REMEDIATION
OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
To appreciate the complexity of the tax treatment of remedia-
tion expenditures it is important to understand the various elements
of environmental law. This includes not only the legal requirements
that may compel or encourage remediation of hazardous substances,
but also the provisions that affect the selection of a final cleanup
standard and the technical options for achieving those standards.
A. Legal Requirements Compelling or Encouraging Expenditures
for Environmental Remediation
There are a variety of federal and state statutory provisions,
contractual requirements, and common law tort requirements that
may affect whether a taxpayer incurs environmental cleanup costs.
Although some of these provisions actually impose remedial obli-
gations, in many cases landowners voluntarily clean up the prop-
erty either to prepare the property for sale or to avoid potential
regulatory or tort obligations. In these cases, statutes like CERCLA
or contractual indemnification provisions establish incentives to
remediate by creating legal causes of action that allow recovery of
all or a portion of cleanup costs from other parties.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). CERCLA is perhaps the most significant statute
affecting expenditures for remediation of hazardous substances. A discussion of its major
provisions follows below.
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1. Statutory Provisions
Although there are several federal statutes that may require
remediation of hazardous substances, 9 the two most significant are
CERCLA 0 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"). 1 Additionally, most states have statutes that are com-
parable to CERCLA and RCRA, and some have statutes requiring
remediation under circumstances not addressed by CERCLA or
RCRA.
a. CERCLA
Under CERCLA, broadly defined classes of people are poten-
tially liable for the cleanup of a site where there has been a "re-
lease or threat of release" of a "hazardous substance" from a "fa-
cility. 12 The definition of "hazardous substance" is particularly
broad and includes substances that have been designated as haz-
ardous under a variety of federal statutes. 13 CERCLA does not,
however, apply to the release of petroleum or crude oil, and thus
its application to oil spills is limited.' 4 Additionally, CERCLA has
been held not to cover removal of asbestos within buildings.' 5
Under section 107(a) of CERCLA, there are four classes of
liable parties, known as "potentially responsible parties" ("PRPs"),
who may be obligated either to remediate the site or to reimburse
others for the cost of remediation. The classes of PRPs include the
following persons:
9. The Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993), and its implementing regulations, for example, contain requirements for
the management, disposal and remediation of polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"). See
Donald W. Stever, Law of Chemical Regulation and Hazardous Waste, § 2.08[2] (1994).
Additionally, regulations issued pursuant to § 112, Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp.
V 1993), govern the disposal of certain asbestos material. Id. § 2.06.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1988).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
13. Section 101(14) of CERCLA defines "hazardous substance" to include sub-
stances designated as hazardous or toxic under (1) § 311, Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321(b)(2)(A) (1988), (2) § 102, CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9602 (1988), (3) § 3001,
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), (4) § 307(a), Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1988), (5) § 112, Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) and (6) § 7, TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1988).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988).
15. See, e.g., 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir.
1990); G.J. Leasing Co. v. Union Elec. Co., 854 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Il. 1994).
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(1) the current owner and operator of the site;
16
(2) the past owner or operator of a site;
17
(3) persons who arranged for disposal of the hazardous substance
that was disposed of at the site;"8 and
(4) the person who transported the substances to the site if they
were involved in selection of the site.19
Liability of PRPs is not only "strict" in that courts do not consider
fault or negligence, 20 but it is also "joint and several." This means
that each PRP is potentially responsible for the entire cost of
cleanup of a site.2'
Pursuant to section 106 of CERCLA, the EPA has the author-
ity to issue an order compelling PRPs to clean up the site them-
selves. 22 In general, parties who receive section 106 orders ulti-
mately enter into negotiated settlement agreements in which they
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988). Owners may have a defense to liability. The
"innocent landowner" provisions, for example, establish a defense if the owner both
purchased without knowledge of the existence of contamination and undertook "appropri-
ate inquiry" at the time of purchase to determine if contamination existed. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35) (1988). See, e.g., Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distribu-
tion Corp., 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Serafini, 791 F. Supp. 107 (M.D.
Pa. 1993); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981). Establishing an
"innocent landowner" defense is extremely difficult, but it is one of the reasons why
environmental audits of property are undertaken prior to the purchase of property. See
Geoffrey D. Patterson, A Buyer's Catalogue of Prepurchase Precautions to Minimize
CERCLA Liability in Commercial Real Estate Transactions, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
469 (1992).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988). Although CERCLA only imposes liability on
parties if they previously owned or operated the site "at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance," several courts have held that prior owners are liable if hazardous substances
leached or migrated during the time they owned the property, or if they undertook
construction activities that resulted in some movement of preexisting contamination.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
20. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
21. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988). Although most
courts have indicated that parties may escape joint and several liability if the harm is
"divisible:' few courts have actually found the harm to be divisible. Several recent
decisions, however, have suggested that liability is not inevitably joint and several. See,
e.g., Bell Petroleum Services v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum
Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). Although Section 106 orders may be issued to "any
person," liability in most cases has been limited to persons classified as PRPs. See United
States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1313 (E.D. Mo. 1987). Congress delegated to the EPA
authority to implement CERCLA. See Exec. Order No. 12,316, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237
(1981), superseded by Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2,923 (1987).
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agree to undertake specified actions to remediate a site.23 Parties to
a settlement generally obtain limited protection from future suits
by other PRPs and by the government.2 4
PRPs who do not actually undertake the cleanup may be liable
under CERCLA to reimburse parties who originally incurred the
cleanup costs. Section 104 of CERCLA authorizes the government
to clean up sites using money from the federal Hazardous Sub-
stances Trust Fund, known as "Superfund, '' 25 and the government
may then recoup these expenses by bringing a cost recovery action
against PRPs.26 Such suits are typically resolved through settlement
agreements in which PRPs pay some proportionate share of the
government costs in exchange for a limited release from liability.27
Additionally, private parties, who may themselves be PRPs,
are authorized under CERCLA to bring cost recovery actions against
other PRPs.21 In general, courts in these actions will equitably
allocate remediation costs among PRPs,2 9 even if there has been no
governmental involvement in the cleanup.30
One major factor may affect the ability of the government and
private parties to recover their cleanup costs: to be eligible for cost
23. Most parties ultimately agree to settle since penalties for noncompliance with
the order include daily penalties of up to $25,000 per day, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (1988),
and treble the final amount of the cleanup, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1988). Further, parties
have only very limited ability to obtain pre-enforcement judicial review of these orders.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). Section 122 of CERCLA specifically addresses requirements
for settlements with the government. 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1988).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f) (1988), § 9613(f) (1988). See generally Karen L.
Demeo, Is CERCLA Working? An Analysis of the Settlement and Contribution Provisions,
68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 493 (1994).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988). The money for these cleanups comes from the
"Superfund" a fund of approximately eight and one-half billion dollars created by a tax
largely falling on petrochemical companies. Superfund, properly known as the "Hazardous
Substances Trust Fund" is established under 26 U.S.C. eh. 98A (1988). Appropriation and
use of the fund are specified in § 111 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988). For a general
discussion of the Superfund tax mechanism, see Carlson & Bausell, Financing Superfund:
An Evaluation of Alternative Tax Mechanisms, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 103 (1987).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988).
27. See Ridgway M. Hall, Jr. et al., Superfund Response Cost Allocations: The Law,
The Science and The Practice, 49 Bus. LAW. 1489 (1994); see also Demeo, supra note
24.
28. These actions are brought under the private cost recovery provisions of section
107(a)(4)(B) or as contribution actions under section 113(0. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)
(1988), § 9613(f) (1988). See generally Jeffrey M. Gaba, Recovering Hazardous Waste
Cleanup Costs: The Private Cause of Action under CERCLA, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 181
(1986).
29. See, e.g., Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 955 F.2d 519 (8th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Moore, 703 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Va. 1988).
30. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.700 (1994).
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recovery, government and private cleanups must be "consistent"
with the "National Contingency Plan" ("NCP").31 The NCP, promul-
gated by the EPA, specifies the substantive and procedural require-
ments for a proper cleanup action. 32 Among other things, the NCP
establishes the regulatory requirements that define the necessary
level of cleanup.
33
b. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") deals
largely with the regulatory requirements for the disposal of solid
and hazardous waste.34 Several important sections, however, can be
the basis for compelling the cleanup of contaminated property.
i. Imminent and Substantial Endangerment
Section 7002(a)(1)(B) of RCRA gives citizens the authority to
bring an action in federal court to obtain an order to abate an
"imminent and substantial endangerment" due to the release of
solid or hazardous waste.35 In many ways, section 7002(a)(1)(B) is
a counterpart to CERCLA since it authorizes courts to order reme-
diation of contaminated property in circumstances in which private
parties can only recover costs under CERCLA. Although courts
have generally held that private parties can only obtain injunctive
relief, at least one court has now held that parties may recover past
response costs under this section.
36
31. Government actions must be "not inconsistent with the national contingency
plan." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988). Private party actions must be "consistent with
the national contingency plan." Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). The actions of parties that
comply with a § 106 order issued by the EPA or an approved settlement agreement are
deemed consistent with the NCP. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(ii) (1994).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (1988). The portions of the NCP dealing with the require-
ments of CERCLA are codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (1994).
33. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (1994).
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988). Subtitle C of RCRA defines the requirements
for the disposal of hazardous wastes. RCRA establishes requirements for the generators,
transporters and facilities that treat, store or dispose of those wastes. Additionally, RCRA
requires the disposal of such wastes in facilities that have received RCRA permits. See
generally The Law of Environmental Protection, Ch. 13 (Sheldon M. Novick et al. eds.,
1989).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1988). Section 7002(a)(1)(A) authorizes, among
other things, citizen suits based on violations of the statutory and regulatory requirements
of RCRA.
36. See, e.g., KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S.Ct. 41 (1995).
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Section 7002(a)(1)(B) is also of considerable importance for
at least two other reasons. First, it has been interpreted to apply to
releases of petroleum that are not otherwise covered by CERCLA.37
Second, it authorizes recovery of attorney's fees that are not recov-
erable in private party cost recovery actions under CERCLA.38
ii. Corrective Action
Several sections of RCRA authorize the government to compel
parties to remediate past contamination. 9 Section 3004(u) of RCRA
gives the government the authority to require parties seeking a
RCRA hazardous waste permit to clean up past contamination at
"solid waste management units. '40 Although RCRA has no cost
recovery provisions, at least one court has held that there is a right
of contribution for costs incurred under the corrective action pro-
visions of RCRA.4
1
iii. Underground Storage Tanks
Finally, RCRA also has a set of provisions applicable to Un-
derground Storage Tanks ("USTs"). Subtitle IX of RCRA applies
to USTs containing products, including petroleum, and non-haz-
ardous wastes.42 In addition to establishing regulatory requirements
for management of USTs, Subtitle IX also imposes "corrective
37. See, e.g., Zands v. Nelson, 779 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Cal. 1991).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1988). The Supreme Court has held that litigation-re-
lated attorney's fees are not recoverable in private party cost recovery actions under
CERCLA. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994).
39. Section 7003 of RCRA authorizes the government to seek injunctive relief in
certain cases when there is an "imminent and substantial endangerment." 42 U.S.C. § 6973
(1988). In large part, this section has been superseded by the government's authority to
act under CERCLA.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u) (1988). Section 3004(v) authorizes the government, in
certain cases, to include requirements for remediation of contamination beyond the facility
boundary. Id. § 6924(v). Additionally, section 3008(h) gives the government the authority
to issue a "corrective action" order for the cleanup of hazardous waste at property that
received or should have applied for "interim status." Id. § 6928(h). See JEFFREY M. GABA
& DONALD W. STEVER, LAW OF SOLID WASTE, POLLUTION PREVENTION AND RECYCLING,
§ 3.03 (1994); Guida, Corrective Action tinder the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 44 Sw. L.J. 1331 (1991).
41. United States v. Valentine, 856 F. Supp. 627 (D. Wyo. 1994).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6991i (1988). See 40 C.F.R. § 280.10-. 116 (Technical
Standards and Corrective Action Requirements for Owners and Operators of Underground
Storage Tanks ("UST")).
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action" obligations that require tank owners or operators to reme-
diate releases from USTs.
43
c. State Statutory Provisions
All states have some statutory provisions by which they can
compel landowners to cleanup contaminated property.44 In Texas,
for example, the Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commis-
sion has broad authority to issue orders compelling the cleanup of
property under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act45 and the Texas
Water Code.46 Additionally, a number of states have statutes that
require the remediation of property prior to the transfer of the
property.47 In addition, most states (and in some cases the federal
government as well) require the reporting and remediation of cer-
tain spills of environmental contaminants.
48
2. Contract
Contractual provisions negotiated as part of the sale of prop-
erty may also affect remediation obligations. Depending on the
particular representations, warranties and indemnification provi-
sions, or other liability provisions, either the buyer or seller may
have contractual liability for the cleanup of property.49 For exam-
ple, it is not uncommon for a real estate contract to include an
indemnification agreement in which the seller agrees to reimburse
43. 42 U.S.C. § 6991 (1988). See 40 C.F.R. § 280.60-.67 Subpart F (1994).
44. See generally DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW Ch. 9 (1993) (discussing hazardous waste site cleanup legislation).
45. See Tax. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.272 (West 1992).
46. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.019 (West 1992).
47. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-6 to -13 (West 1991) (New Jersey Industrial
Site Recovery Act, previously known as the Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-134 to -134e (West Supp. 1995).
48. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL SPILL REPORTING HANDBOOK (CBC 1995), Mor-
gan, Lewis & Bockius.
49. See generally Penny L. Parker & John Slavich, Contractual Efforts to Allocate
the Risk of Environmental Liability: Is There a Way to Make Indemnities Worth More than
the Paper They Are Written On?, 44 Sw. L.J. 1349 (1991) (discussing the legal principles
regulating contractual risk allocation provisions); Michael 0. Ellis, Private Indemnity
Agreements Under Section 107(e) of CERCLA, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1953 (Dec. 6, 1991).
Although parties cannot contractually transfer their liability under CERCLA, they can
enter into contracts that require other parties to indemnify them for costs that they incur.
See, e.g., AM Int'l, Inc. v. International Forging Equip. Corp., 982 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.
1993).
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the buyer for any environmental cleanup costs that the buyer incurs
as a result of existing contamination at the time of sale.
3. Common Law Torts
Environmental remediation is also affected by potential tort
liability. Contamination of neighboring property may give rise to
liability in nuisance, negligence, strict liability and trespass,50 and
available remedies may include both damages and injunctive relief.
B. Determining Cleanup Levels
Determining the necessary level of cleanup to be attained by
a remediation effort is one of the most difficult and contentious
issues in environmental law. The resolution of this issue, frequently
referred to as "how clean is clean," is obviously significant since
it will affect not only the cost and technology employed in a
remediation, but also the possible future uses of contaminated prop-
erty.51
In general, determination of cleanup levels typically may be
based on one or more of the following approaches. In some cases,
cleanup may require attainment of "background" levels of pollu-
tion.52 This may mean removal of all contamination. In other cases,
cleanup levels are established based on some determination of
"health-based" requirements, 53 where cleanup levels are based on
some assessment of the effects of residual contamination on human
health. Another approach sets cleanup levels based on considera-
tions of cost and technological feasibility.54 The process is even
50. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
51. See Ferris & Rees, supra note 1, at 804; Donald A. Brown, EPA's Resolution
of the Conflict Between Cleanup Costs and the Law in Setting Cleanup Standards Under
Superfund, 15 CoLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 241 (1990).
52. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 264.94 (a)(1) (1994); 30 Thx. ADMIN. CODE 335.554 (West
Supp. 1995).
53. Under CERCLA, for example, health-based standards for carcinogens generally
require removal of carcinogenic pollutants to levels that will not result in an increased
cancer risk to an exposed individual ranging from 1 in I million to 1 in 10,000. 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.430(e)(2)(A)(2) (1994).
54. The role of costs and technological feasibility in setting cleanup standards under
CERCLA is confusing. See Brown, supra note 51. Groundwater standards must in many
cases attain "Maximum Contaminant Levels" ("MCLs") set under the Safe Drinking Water
Act, 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(B) (1994), and these MCLs are established based in part
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more difficult if cleanup standards are tailored to possible future
uses of property. For example, cleanup levels may be less stringent
under some statutes if deed restrictions limit the property to non-
residential use.55
Since the elements for establishing cleanup levels are unclear,
hazardous waste remediation will not always require restoration of
the property to pre-existing conditions. In almost no case will
remediation levels be based on conditions that existed at the time
a landowner purchased the property. In some cases, especially when
landowners remediate property that has been put to industrial use
for many years, the remediation may effectively mean that property
can be put to greater use. However, if some form of deed restriction
is employed, it may mean that certain uses are now precluded.
C. Cleanup Technologies
There are a wide variety of techniques available for remedia-
tion of contaminated property. In many cases, the same levels of
cleanup can be attained through the use of different technologies
that vary with respect to cost, necessity for construction of on-site
physical treatment systems and need for long term operation and
maintenance. Generally, techniques involve either removal of the
contaminated material from the property,56 treatment of the con-
tamination on-site 7 or containment of the contamination to prevent
further migration.58 Selection of the appropriate technique typically
involves consideration of an array of factors including cost, the
on the costs and feasibility of meeting health-based standards by public water supply
systems. See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(4) (1988). Additionally, CERCLA allows the EPA to
alter otherwise applicable cleanup standards based on considerations that include techno-
logical feasibility. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(4)(C) (1988).
55. See, e.g., 30 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 335.560 (West Supp. 1995).
56. In many cases, especially with contaminated soil from leaking underground
storage tanks, contaminated soil is excavated and sent for off-site disposal in an approved
landfill or incinerator. See, e.g., TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 335.554 (b)-(c) (West Supp. 1995).
57. In many cases, contaminated groundwater is handled by the construction of
wells to pump the groundwater to the surface for treatment at on-site treatment facilities
to remove contaminants. The treated groundwater is then reinjected back into the ground.
See Ferris & Rees, supra note 1, at 815.
58. "Slurry walls," for example, are sometimes constructed to prevent migration of
contaminated groundwater. In other cases, contaminated areas are simply paved with an
impermeable material to minimize the possibility that rain will leach into the ground and
cause further migration. Cf Randy M. Mott, Acquifer Restoration under CERCLA: New
Realities and Old Myths, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1301 (Aug. 28, 1992).
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permanence of the remediation, the technological feasibility of
removal and assessment of future uses of the property.
]JI. BASIC TAX CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING DEDUCTION OF THE
COSTS OF REMEDIATION OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
Persons who have incurred hazardous waste remediation costs
face several tax issues. 59 The central concern is whether these costs
are to be treated as "expenses" or "capital expenditures. '60 The
distinction between "expense" and "capital expenditure" has sig-
nificant financial implications. Ordinary expenses can, in most cases,
be deducted against ordinary income in the year in which they are
incurred. 61 Capital expenditures, however, are not deductible in the
year in which they are incurred. 62 If the expenditures relate to items
that have a determinable useful life, taxpayers may be allowed to
recover their costs through amortization or depreciation of the
expense over some fixed period of time.63 Capital expenditures for
items that do not have a fixed life, such as land, are neither de-
ductible nor depreciable. 64 Rather, these expenditures are added to
the "basis" of the property, and the tax consequence of the expen-
59. This Article does not address all tax consequences associated with environ-
mental expenditures. These include, among others, issues relating to property tax assess-
ment of contaminated property, see Bonnie H. Keen, Tax Assessment of Contaminated
Property: Tax Breaks for Polluters?, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 885 (1992); estate tax
issues, see Patricia G. Copeland, Ownership of Contaminated Property Raises Estate
Planning Concerns, 81 J. TAX'N 50 (1994); or the deductibility of fines paid for violating
environmental laws or "supplemental environmental projects" undertaken to reduce envi-
ronmental fines, see Evan Slavitt, An Overview of the Tax Implications of Environmental
Litigation, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10547 (Dec. 1990).
60. "Expenses" will be used as a term to describe costs or outlays that are deductible
as ordinary and necessary business expenses. "Capital expenditures" will be used to
describe costs or outlays that may be capitalized. The terms "expenditures," "costs" or
"outlays" will be used to describe costs without reference to their status as expenses or
capital expenditures.
61. See I.R.C. § 162 (1994). Additionally, I.R.C. § 212 (1994) authorizes certain
entities to deduct expenses incurred in the production of income. See generally BORIS I.
BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 1 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS
§ 20.1.1 (1988).
62. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 174 (1994).
63. I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (1994). Additionally, in 1993, Congress added I.R.C. § 197(a),
which allows the amortization over a 15-year period of some "intangible" capital items
such as goodwill.
64. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (1994); BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 61, at
§ 23.25.
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diture is realized, if at all, at some indefinite future time on the
sale or other disposition of the asset.65
Despite the importance of the issue, there are no certain an-
swers on classification of costs as "expenses" or "capital expendi-
tures." Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code give some guid-
ance, but neither the Code, IRS regulations and rulings nor caselaw
establish consistent principles that resolve the ambiguities.
A. Basic Code Provisions
There are several provisions of the Code that directly address
the classification of expenditures. Section 162(a) establishes the
basic requirements for deduction of ordinary and necessary ex-
penses in any given tax year. Sections 263 and 263A generally
prohibit deductions for capital expenditures.
1. Section 162(a)
Section 162(a) provides for the deduction of "all ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business. 66 There are several prerequisites
for the deduction of ordinary expenses in a given tax year. To be
deductible under section 162(a), an expenditure must be (1) ordi-
nary and necessary, (2) part of an ongoing trade or business, (3) paid
or incurred in the tax year and (4) an expense (as opposed to
capital expenditure).67 Additionally, penalties such as civil fines
may not be deducted.68
a. "Ordinary and Necessary"
An expense may not be deducted under section 162 unless it
is an "ordinary and necessary" business expense. Establishing that
65. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1994). See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 61, at
§§ 5.4, 40.1. A requirement that an expenditure be capitalized without the opportunity for
depreciation or amortization can have a significant economic impact on the taxpayer. The
taxpayer loses the time value of the money paid immediately in taxes, since the U.S.
Treasury, not the taxpayer, earns the interest on that money until sale of the asset.
66. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1994).
67. I.R.C. § 162 (1994).
68. Id.
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an expense meets this criteria generally does not raise difficult
issues. 69 Even unusual or infrequent expenses can be ordinary and
necessary if they are normally incurred by average taxpayers in a
particular type of business.70
b. Ongoing Trade or Business
To be deductible as an ordinary expense, the expense must
also have been incurred as part of an ongoing trade or business. A
taxpayer's expenses in preparation for a new trade or business may
not be deductible.71 Therefore, expenses incurred while investigat-
ing a new business, such as preliminary environmental audits of a
business that was not purchased, may raise some questions relating
to status as deductible expenses.
72
c. Paid or Incurred
An expense must be paid or incurred during the tax year to be
deducted.73 Determination of the time at which an expense is in-
curred is mandated by the accounting method of the taxpayer.
Expenses by taxpayers under a "cash" method of accounting are
generally incurred in the year in which the money is actually
spent.74 Expenses by taxpayers using the "accrual" method are not
incurred until "economic performance" has occurred." In general,
the "economic performance" test means that an accrual basis tax-
payer cannot deduct expenditures until money is paid or services
are actually performed.
76
Particular issues of timing are raised when environmental re-
mediation expenses are paid into a settlement fund for later use.
69. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 61, at § 20.3.
70. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
71. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 61, at § 20.4.4.
72. See Frank v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 511 (1953); see also DOUGLAS A. KAHN,
FEDERAL INCOME TAX: A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (2d ed.
1992) § 10.1452, .1453.
73. I.R.C. § 162 (1994).
74. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (1954).
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1954).
76. In 1984, Congress added section 468 to the Code. This section creates an
exception to the "economic performance" rule by allowing the deduction of certain
payments when made to "reserve funds" established to provide reclamation and closing
costs for mining or solid waste disposal property. I.R.C. § 468(a)(1) (1988). See Tech,
Adv. Mem. 94-48-002 (Dec. 2, 1994).
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In 1986, Congress enacted section 468B of the Code providing that
economic performance occurs when money is paid into certain
"designated settlement funds." In 1992, the IRS adopted new regu-
lations that expressly provide that money paid pursuant to CER-
CLA liability into a "qualified settlement fund" will be treated as
economic performance in most cases.77 Under the regulation, some
limited class of taxpayers may be able to treat the date of payment
of money to an EPA or court ordered CERCLA settlement fund as
the time at which economic performance occurs.78 It is important
to note that the regulations do not determine whether the payment
is deductible as an ordinary expense79. They merely address the
timing of economic performance for the purpose of determining
tax consequences.
d. Expense
Section 162(a) allows the deduction of "expenses" but not
"capital expenditures." This distinction is explored in detail be-
low. 0
e. Fines and Penalties
Section 162(f) of the Code prohibits the deduction of any fine
or penalty paid to the government.81 Thus, characterization of an
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.468B (1992). In general, payments made to a qualified settle-
ment fund substitute "economic performance" for purposes of section 461(h) of the Code.
Economic performance will not occur, however, if the transferor has, in certain cases, a
right for a refund or reversion of the property. Id. § 1.468B-3(c).
78. Persons providing property or services to a "qualified settlement fund" in order
to satisfy CERCLA liabilities are subject to section 468B rules only if, following the
transfer of such property or services, the taxpayer's only remaining liability to the EPA is
"a remote, future obligation to provide services or property." Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-l(f)(2)
(1992). It is possible that only a class of de minimis settlors, who are entitled to receive
a broad release from future liability, may be able to take advantage of these provisions.
See Glenn Carrington, Tax Treatment of Environmental Clean Up Costs, C967 ALI-ABA
861. (1994), available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL Library.
79. For a discussion of the issues raised by the regulation, see Ellen K. Harrison &
Gary B. Wilcox, Settlement Fund Final Regulations Answer Many Questions, But Problems
Still Exist, 78 J. TAX'N 342 (June 1993); Thomas H. Yancey & Nina B. Finston, Qualified
Settlement Funds and Their Use in Funding Environmental Cleanups, 6 Toxics L. REPT.
(BNA) 1525 (May 13, 1992).
80. See infra part III.B.
81. I.R.C. § 162(f) (1994). The section states: "No deduction shall be allowed under
subsection (a) for any fine or similar penalty paid to a government for the violation of any
law."
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expense as a fine or penalty can affect its deductibility. In most
cases, hazardous waste remediation expenses incurred under RCRA
or CERCLA are not penalties.8 2 In some cases, however, agree-
ments to perform remediation as a result of settlement can raise
questions as to the proper classification of the expense. 3
2. Sections 263 and 263A
Section 263 prohibits the deduction of "any amount paid out for
new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made
to increase the value of any property or estate. ' 4 Section 263 is, in
essence, the evil twin of section 162(a). It confirms the implication
of section 162(a), that capital expenditures are not deductible under
the provisions governing deduction of ordinary expenses.85
Section 263A of the Internal Revenue Code provides that tax-
payers must capitalize certain expenditures incurred in the produc-
tion of real or tangible personal property in a trade or business.
8 6
The word "produce" is defined in the Code to include "construct,
build, install, manufacture, develop, or improve?' 8 Thus, the tax-
payer must capitalize its costs associated with the construction of
tangible equipment under this section. Its application to improve-
ments of real property is much less clear.
B. Distinguishing Ordinary Expenses from Capital Expenditures
Ordinary expenses and capital expenditures are distinguished
in order to allocate the deduction for an expense to the year in
which the benefit from the expense occurs.88 Thus, ordinary ex-
82. Expenses under CERCLA, for example, have generally been held to have been
incurred for remedial and not punitive purposes. See United States V. Monsanto, 858 F.2d
160 (4th Cir. 1988).
83. See William L. Raby, No Deduction for Pollution Fund Payment that Reduces
Criminal Fine, 55 TAX NoTEs 943 (May 18, 1992); Patricia L. Truscelli & Alan J. Tarr,
Issues Concerning the Deductibility of Certain Environmental Expenditures Under the
Internal Revenue Code, C981 ALI-ABA 49 (1995), available in WESTLAWv, TP-ALL
Library.
84. I.R.C. § 263 (1994).
85. I.R.C. § 161 (1994) also specifically provides that the provisions of section 263
limit the availability of deductions under section 162.
86. I.R.C. § 263A(b)(1) (1994).
87. Id. at § 263A(g)(1).
88. See Indopco v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992); Commissioner v. Idaho
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penses that produce a benefit in the year they are incurred are
deductible in that year. Capital expenditures, for items with a fixed
life that produce a long-term benefit over many years, must be
depreciated as costs allocated over a period that theoretically cor-
responds to the benefit of the expenditure. Although the Code
clearly authorizes deductions for ordinary expenses, 9 the burden is
on the taxpayer to justify such deductions; the Supreme Court has
stated that "deductions are exceptions from the norm of capitaliza-
tion."90
However, there are no simple rules that clearly distinguish
between expenses and capital expenditures, and the Supreme Court
has recognized that the distinctions "are those of degree and not
kind."9' There are a number of different ways to approach this
issue.
1. Repair vs. Improvement
One common approach to distinguishing expenses from capital
expenditures is to determine whether the expenditure is in the
nature of a repair as opposed to an improvement of property.
92
"Repairs" act merely to maintain property and not to increase its
value and therefore are generally deductible as ordinary expenses.
"Improvements," in contrast, generally increase the value of prop-
erty, or allow new and profitable uses of property, and must be
capitalized.
IRS regulations provide that "repairs" may immediately be
deducted as ordinary and necessary expenses, while long-term im-
provements to the property must be treated as non-deductible capi-
tal expenditures. IRS regulations implementing section 162 pro-
vide:
The cost of incidental repairs which neither materially add to
the value of the property nor appreciably prolong its life, but
keep it in an ordinarily efficient operating condition, may be
deducted as an expense. Repairs in the nature of replacements,
Power, 418 U.S. 1 (1974); United States v. Mississippi Chemical Corp., 405 U.S. 298
(1972).
89. I.R.C. § 162 (1994).
90. Indopco, 503 U.S. at 79.
91. Id.
92. See Brr-ER & LoKKEN, supra note 61, at § 20.4.8.
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to the extent that they arrest deterioration or appreciably pro-
long the life of the property, shall either be capitalized or
depreciated in accordance with section 167 or charged against
the depreciation reserve if such an account is kept.
93
Similarly, the regulations implementing section 263 imply a dis-
tinction between repairs and improvements. Treasury Regulation
§ 1.263(a)-l(b) provides in general that section 263 prohibits the
deduction of
amounts paid or incurred (1) to add to the value or substantially
prolong the useful life of property owned by the taxpayer, such
as plant or equipment, or (2) to adapt property to a new or
different use. Amounts paid or incurred for incidental repairs
and maintenance of property are not capital expenditures . . .4
Since all repairs in some sense add to the long term value of
property, drawing the line between deductible repairs and non-de-
ductible improvements has been difficult. Courts have produced
inconsistent and confusing rulings on this distinction, employing a
variety of criteria, including: the magnitude of the expenditures,
whether they produce a long term benefit, whether they increase
the useful life of property, whether they adapt property to new
uses, and, possibly, whether they are in response to an immediate
and unplanned situation.95
One line of cases strongly suggests treating expenses that are
designed to maintain the property for its existing use or to return
the property to a pre-existing condition should be treated as de-
ductible repairs. Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commissioner9 6 held,
in part, that expenses should be deducted as repairs if the value of
the property after the expenditure was the same as the value before
the event requiring the expenditure-a "before and after" test. The
taxpayer in Plainfield- Union was a water company that cleaned
existing cast iron pipes and lined them with cement to prevent
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1960).
94. Id. § 1.263(a)-l(b).
95. There is no clearly defined list of factors that are used to draw this distinction,
and commentators analyze the factors in different ways. Compare BITTKER & LOKKEN,
supra note 66, at § 20.4.8 with Michael M. Megaard & Susan L. Megaard, IRS Explains
Deductions for Environmental Cleanup Costs, 23 TAX'N FOR LAWYERS 152 (1994); see
also, Carringtion, supra, note 78.
96. 39 T.C. 333 (1962).
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problems caused by the use of acidic water. The Tax Court allowed
this expense to be deducted as a repair since it merely restored the
original water carrying capacity of the pipes without resulting in
any new or additional uses. 97 The court noted that:
any properly performed repair adds value as compared with the
situation immediately prior to the repair. The proper test is
whether the expenditure materially enhances the value, use, life
expectancy, strength, or capacity as compared with the status of
the asset prior to the condition necessitating the expenditure. 98
The court concluded that the activity was a repair since, among
other things, it did not increase the value of the property as com-
pared with its value prior to the existence of the "condition neces-
sitating the expenditure" '99
Similarly, in Appeal of Illinois Merchants Trust Co.,100 the
court applied this "before and after" or "restoration" principle. The
case involved the deductibility of the costs of removing and replac-
ing rotting wooden foundation piles at a warehouse located on a
river. The Board of Tax Appeals held that these expenses were
currently deductible, noting:
In determining whether an expenditure is a capital one or is
chargeable against operating income, it is necessary to bear in
mind the purpose for which the expenditure is made. To repair
is to restore to a sound state or to mend, while a replacement
connotes a substitution. A repair is an expenditure for the
purpose of keeping the property in an ordinarily efficient oper-
ating condition. It does not add to the value of the property, nor
does it appreciably prolong its life. It merely keeps the property
in an operating condition over the probable useful life for the
97. Id. at 341.
98. Id. at 338.
99. The court, in conclusion, stated:
The useful life, strength, value, and capacity of the cleaned and lined water
pipes were not increased by the expenditure in issue. Said expenditure did not
make the relevant water main suitable for new or additional use. Said main
continued to be used in the normal course of petitioner's operations as a water
company. Viewing the record as a whole, we hold that the cleaning and cement
lining of the Maple Avenue main in 1957 was a repair, the cost of which is
deductible under section 162(a).
Id. at 341.
100. 4 B.T.A. 103 (1926).
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uses for which it was acquired. Expenditures for that purpose
are distinguishable from those for replacements, alterations,
improvements or additions which prolong the life of the prop-
erty, increase its value, or make it adaptable to a different use.' '
Other courts, rather than focusing on changes that occurred
during the period of ownership by the taxpayer, have been more
willing to allow the deduction of expenses used to remedy latent,
pre-existing conditions if that remedy allows the property to be
used for its original intended purpose. In American Bemberg Corp.
v. Commissioner,0 2 the company owned a plant built on unstable
land that had periodic cave-ins. The company spent over $900,000
filling underground cavities with grout and cement to prevent these
cave-ins. The Tax Court stated that three factors were relevant in
determining whether these expenditures were deductible repairs or
capital improvements: (1) the purpose of the work; (2) the physical
nature of the work; and (3) the effect of the work. The court found
that the purpose of the work was to avoid disaster, rather than to
improve or increase the original plant, and that nothing new had
been created. The court noted that the fault had not been cured but
that the immediate consequences of the fault had been remedied.
Therefore, the court held that these expenses were deductible re-
pairs rather than capital improvements.0 3
Other lines of cases, however, suggest a greater willingness to
find long term benefit from expenditures that allow the taxpayer to
continue its current operations. In Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v.
Commissioner,104 the Tax Court refused to allow the taxpayer to
deduct as repairs the costs of "draglining" ditches in an irrigation
system to clear them of sediment. The court noted that the effect
of the activity was to restore their prior capacity, but nonetheless
found that the costs should be capitalized since the expenses were
part of a systematic plan to clear the irrigation canals and make
them more efficient. 05 The court noted that: "a cleaned ditch or
reworked levee is of more value than is one in need of repair. A
more efficient system renders the ranch more productive and valu-
101. Id. at 106.
102. 10 T.C. 361 (1948), aff'd 177 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1949).
103. Id. at 377.
104. 72 T.C. 1 (1979).
105. Id. at 12-13.
[Vol. 20
1996] Tax Deduction of Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs 81
able." 106 The court also relied on the fact that the expenses were of
substantial magnitude. Rather than being "incidental repairs" the
court held that they were "in the nature of capital 'replacement'
expenditures which must be capitalized and amortized over their
appropriate useful lives." 107
A recent TAM also suggests that large and infrequent expen-
ditures that are necessary to preserve existing operations must be
capitalized. 108 The situation involved expenditures by the owner of
an offshore oil field to raise the level of storage tanks and construct
a barrier wall to prevent the release of oil. The construction was
necessary because existing tanks had subsided as a result of past
oil and gas extraction.10 9 The taxpayer argued that the activity was
a deductible repair since it merely allowed continued operation of
the field. The IRS, however, relying largely on Wolfsen, held a
large expenditure was not "incidental" and produced a long-term
benefit to the taxpayer.
Courts have split on the issue of whether costs incurred to
comply with government regulations must be deducted or capital-
ized. Some courts have held that such costs are deductible if they
do not otherwise increase the value or useful life of property. In
Midland Empire Packing Co. v. Commissioner,'10 oil from a nearby
refinery contaminated the basement of a meat packing company.
Federal meat inspectors ordered Midland to oil proof its basement
or shut down, and as a result, the company lined the walls and
floors with concrete to prevent the contamination. The Tax Court
allowed the company to deduct these expenditures since the peti-
tioner "made the repair in question in order that it might continue
to operate its plant." 1' The court noted that lining the walls did
not "increase the useful life of the building or make the building
more valuable for any purpose than it had been before the oil had
come into the basement' 2
106. Id. at 17.
107. Id. at 18.
108. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-24-002 (February 9, 1994).
109. Although the taxpayer had not yet received any government order to undertake
the construction, it had been informed that the facility would be "shut down" if the
construction was not undertaken. Id.
110. 14 T.C. 635 (1950).
111. Id. at 642.
112. Id. at 639.
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Other cases, however, have held that expenditures made to
comply with government regulations must be capitalized even if
the effect is merely to allow the taxpayer to continue its prior
operations. In Teitelbaum v. Commissioner,"3 the court required the
taxpayer to capitalize the costs of converting its electrical system
from D.C. to A.C. as required by city code. The court held that
while this expenditure did not prolong the useful life of the build-
ing, it did make it more valuable by bringing the property into
compliance with the law. Similarly, in Blue Creek Coal v. Commis-
sioner,"4 the IRS required a taxpayer to capitalize the costs of
installing enclosed cabs on bulldozers as required by the Federal
Mine, Health and Safety Administration. The expense did not in-
crease the useful life of otherwise operational bulldozers, but did
increase their value by bringing them into compliance with appli-
cable law." 5
The case law also suggests that expenditures made to preserve
a given use must be capitalized if it involves construction of equip-
ment that itself constitutes a permanent addition. In Woolrich Woolen
Mills v. U.S., 1 6 the court held that the costs of a filtration plant
built under order of the state was a non-deductible capital improve-
ment even though it did not add to productive capacity. Rather, the
court reasoned that such a plant was a permanent addition having
a useful life beyond the tax year." 7 Similarly, in Mt. Morris Drive-
In Theatre Co. v. Commissioner,"8 the company sought to deduct
the cost of a drainage system for an existing drive-in theater. The
court held that these costs were not deductible as repairs since they
involved the acquisition and construction of a new asset-the new
drainage system." 9 Additionally, the court noted that the costs were
foreseeable at the time of the acquisition of the property.
20
A final possible analysis of several of the above cases suggests
that expenses incurred in response to sudden or unplanned situ-
113. 294 F2d 541 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
114. 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504 (1984).
115. See also Hotel Sulgrave v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 619 (1954) (costs of
installing sprinkler system in a building, required by city order, must be capitalized even
though expense did not increase value of the property or prolong its useful life).
116. 289 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1961).
117. Id. at 449.
118. 25 T.C. 272 (1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1956).
119. Id. at 274-75.
120. Id. at 275.
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ations to be treated as repairs. 121 Plainfield- Union, Illinois Mer-
chants Trust, and Midland Empire all, to some extent, involved
responses to unplanned events or changed conditions that affected
the function of existing equipment. In Plainfield-Union the tax-
payer restored pipes damaged by water with increased acidity.122
Illinois Merchants Trust involved replacements of rotting piers.
Midland Empire concerned expenses to protect property from newly
discovered off-site contamination. In these cases, the court seemed
to recognize that the taxpayer was responding to changed condi-
tions, and was merely restoring equipment to its former function.
In contrast, Wolfsen, Woolrich Woolen and Mt. Morris involved
expenses that did not result from sudden or unexpected changes to
capital equipment. They concerned either planned long term main-
tenance or responses to external government requirements.
2. INDOPCO and Future Benefits
The distinction between repair and improvement in part fo-
cuses on whether some future benefit results from the expenditure.
In Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner,123 the Supreme Court considered
all benefits the business expenses produced in determining whether
it was to be treated as an ordinary expense or capital expenditure.
The case involved the deductibility of certain investment banking
fees and attorney expenses a target company incurred in a friendly
take-over. The Supreme Court noted that "deductions are excep-
tions to the norm of capitalization," and held that the costs were
capital expenditures. 124
In reaching this conclusion the Court largely focused on the
long term benefit that the target company received by being ac-
quired. In Indopco's case, these benefits included the access to the
acquiring company's resources and the replacement of many share-
holders by a single shareholder. The Court stated that
121. Certain costs relating to accidental and unplanned events may be separately
deductible under section 165. See infra text accompanying note 147.
122. The court in Plainfield-Union, however, expressly held that deductions may be
allowable even though the damage results from gradual, rather than sudden or unexpected,
activities. Plainfield-Union v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333, 340 (1962).
123. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
124. Id.
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Although the mere presence of an incidental future benefit-
"some future aspect"-may not warrant capitalization, a tax-
payer's realization of benefits beyond the year in which the
expenditure is incurred is undeniably important in determining
whether the appropriate tax treatment is immediate deduction
or capitalization.125
The Court held that the expenses could be capital expenditures
although no tangible asset was created or improved. t26 The Court
distinguished Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Assn,' 27
which had required capitalization of expenses associated with a
separate and distinct asset. The Court wrote:
Lincoln Savings stands for the simple proposition that a tax-
payer's expenditure that "serves to create or enhance ...a
separate and distinct" asset should be capitalized under § 263.
It by no means follows, however, that only expenditures that
create or enhance separate and distinct assets are to be capital-
ized under § 263.128
In 1994, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 94-12 that purports
to address the applicability of Indopco to incidental repair ex-
penses.1 29 Unfortunately, it does not. The Ruling curiously charac-
terizes Indopco as "clarifying" that the creation or enhancement of
a separate and distinct asset is not a prerequisite to capitalization. 3 0
The Ruling then simply states that "the Indopco decision does not
affect the treatment of the cost of incidental repairs under section
162 of the Code. '13' That statement is to a certain extent true. What
the Ruling does not address is the extent to which the Supreme
Court's analysis in Indopco affects the classification of whether an
expense is an "incidental repair" based on an assessment of future
benefits. The IRS in subsequent statements has continued to rely
125. Id. at 87.
126. Id. at 86-87.
127. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
128. Indopco, 503 U.S. at 86-87. As discussed below, this quotation raises the
specter that remediation expenses paid by former landowners or off-site generators might
be treated as capital expenses notwithstanding the fact that they are not benefitting any
specific asset that they own.
129. Rev. Rul. 94-12, 1994-1 C.B. 36.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 37.
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on an assessment of long-term benefits in characterizing an item
as a capital expenditure.
1 32
3. Plans for Rehabilitation
An expenditure may independently be classified as a capital
expenditure if it is part of a general plan of rehabilitation of prop-
erty. Under the plan of rehabilitation doctrine, costs incurred as
part of some overall scheme to repair or rehabilitate property must
be capitalized even if the individual expenditure, in the absence of
such a scheme, would have been deductible.
1 33
In U.S. v. Wehrli,134 the court noted that determining whether
an expenditure is made as part of a plan of rehabilitation requires:
A realistic appraisal of all the surrounding facts and circum-
stances, including, but not limited to, the purpose, nature,
extent, and value of the work done, e.g., whether the work was
done to suit the needs of the incoming tenant, or to adapt the
property to a different use, or . . . whether what was done
resulted in any appreciable enhancement of the property's value.
35
In Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. United States,3 6 the court used
the plan of rehabilitation doctrine to require capitalization of ex-
penditures for the repair and restoration of an in-place pipeline.
The taxpayer had deducted expenses related to restoring gas lines
including the costs of digging, removing, repairing, and returning
the pipes to the ground. The court found that the expenses should
132. The IRS in a subsequent Technical Advice Memorandum relied on Revenue
Ruling 94-12 for the proposition that Indopco did not affect the treatment of incidental
repairs. Curiously, in that opinion, Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-24-002 (February 9, 1994), the
IRS relied on Wolfsen to conclude that large maintenance expenses necessary to allow the
taxpayer to continue its operations must be capitalized since the expenses conferred
significant long-term benefits. See supra text accompanying note 108.
133. In Stoeltzing v Commissioner, 266 F.2d 374, 376-77 (3d Cir. 1959), the court
relied on the plan of rehabilitation doctrine to hold that costs incurred to renovate an old
building must be capitalized even though individual items might have been deductible.
134. 400 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968).
135. See California Casket Co. v Commissioner, 19 T.C. 32, 37-38 (1952) (expen-
ditures for remodeling old warehouse must be capitalized since taxpayer had an express
intention and purpose of completely renovating and altering property). See also Mt. Morris
Drive-In Theatre v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 272 (1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1956),
see supra text accompanying note 118.
136. 449 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972).
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appropriately be capitalized since, in addition to increasing capac-
ity and longevity associated with the new pipe, the restoration was
part of an overall plan of rehabilitation that was "well defined in
scope and . ..of considerable significance in view of the [tax-
payer's] overall operations.'
1 37
The plan of rehabilitation doctrine raises a number of par-
ticular issues. First, application of the doctrine requires inquiry
into the "intent" of the taxpayer. The taxpayer must capitalize
deductible expenses if it has formed some plan or scheme for
rehabilitation. Second, the timing of expenses may affect whether
they are characterized as part of a plan of rehabilitation. Expenses
occurring shortly before or after sale of property that remedy con-
ditions are more likely to be characterized as being part of a plan
of rehabilitation. Finally, cases such as Wolfsen suggest that where
a taxpayer foregoes annual maintenance in favor of periodic but
infrequent renovation of property, its renovation expenses may be
viewed as part of a plan of rehabilitation and therefore capital
expenses.
4. Assumption of Liabilities
Special tax issues arise when, as part of a "taxable acquisi-
tion" of an asset a buyer assumes the liabilities of a seller.138 In
general, the assumed liability .is treated as part of the cost of the
acquisition, and the buyer's purchase price is considered to have
included the value of the assumed liability. Payments on these
liabilities generally may not be deducted but must be used to adjust
the basis in the acquired asset.
These rules are relatively clear when applied to the assumption
of fixed and determined liabilities. In such cases, the buyer gener-
ally will be required to treat the value of the assumed fixed liabili-
ties as part of its purchase price. As such, the buyer cannot deduct
payment on these liabilities; rather the payment will be reflected
137. Id. at 821-22.
138. A company's acquisition of the assets of another company will normally be
treated as a taxable event. However, in TAM 95-212-35 (October 30, 1995), the IRS
recently held that contingent environmental liabilities assumed by the newly formed
subsidiary in a section 351 exchange are not taxable liabilities. The IRS also held that the
new liabilities of the subsidiary would be treated in the same manner as if they were owned
by the parent.
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by a higher cost basis in the acquired asset.'39 This may be the case
even if the owner of the asset had made the expenditure. 40 The
seller generally must include the value of the fixed liabilities as
part of the sale price.
141
Far less clear is the treatment of the assumption of contingent
liabilities that are either uncertain in amount, or which may never
require payment. 42 In general, however, it is likely that buyers that
assume contingent liabilities will be required to capitalize, as an
adjustment to basis, the money paid to satisfy those liabilities. 43
In David R. Webb Co. v. Commissioner,44 for example, a pension-
type liability was assumed in connection with the purchase of
assets of an operating business. The Court of Appeals held that
payments to a widow, made as a result of a liability assumed as
139. See Lifson v. Commissioner, 98 F.2d 508 (8th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 662 (1939). The tax regulations provide for allocation of the amount of the assumed
liabilities among the acquired assets. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1-1060-IT(d) (1988).
140. See Hyde v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 300 (1975).
141. See Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-l(f)(5) (1995) (calculation of deemed sales
price for stock acquisition treated as asset purchase); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-1T(c)
(calculation of amount realized in case of asset purchase). When the buyer assumes the
liability, this will generally be treated as payment of the seller's liability. To the extent
that payment of the liability is otherwise deductible, the seller may be able to take an
offsetting deduction for the value of the assumed liability. See Commercial See. Bank v.
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 145 (1981).
For example, assume a seller has an asset worth $500 and a fixed liability of $100.
If the buyer pays $500 for the asset and assumes the liability, the seller generally will be
treated as having received consideration of $600 in the transaction, but may be able to
claim a $100 deduction for payment of the liability.
142. The definition of a "contingent liability" is not clear. There is no specific
definition applicable in the case of an actual asset sale under Treas. Reg. 1060. In the case
of a deemed asset sale under section 338, the regulations simply provide that a contingent
liability is one that is not fixed and determinable. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(b)(1) (1995).
143. Although this is the most likely treatment of payments made to satisfy
contingent liabilities, it is not the only possibility. Some commentators have suggested that
the value of a contingent liability could be assessed at time of sale and the basis adjusted
at that time to reflect this projected value or, alternatively, that subsequent payments to
satisfy an assumed contingent liability could simply be deducted at the time of payment.
See, e.g., Report on the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Contingent Liabilities in Taxable
Asset Acquisition Transactions (N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section), TAX NOTEs 883 (Nov.
19, 1990).
Neither section 1060 nor section 338(h)(10) deal directly with the treatment of the
assumption of contingent liabilities. See I.R.C. § 1060 (1994); see I.R.C. § 338(h)(10)
(1994). Regulations implementing section 338 (stock acquisition treated as asset acquisi-
tion) provide that the seller must make an "accounting" when contingent liabilities become
fixed. At this point, the seller may be required to adjust the amount realized on sale of
the asset to reflect the now fixed value of the contingent liability. Similarly, such an
accounting should require an increase in basis to the buyer. See Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-
1(f)(2) (1995); Temp. Treas. Reg. 1.338(b)-3T(h)(1)(i) (1995). See Ellen H. De Mont, Tax
Treatment of Contingent Liabilities: The Need for Refonn, 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 113 (1994).
144. 77 T.C. 1134 (1981), aff'd, 708 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1983).
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part of the transaction, were capital expenditures that must be used
to adjust the basis in the asset.
45
5. Casualty Losses
Finally, in some cases, expenses that might otherwise be capi-
talized may be deducted if treated as casualty losses. Section 165
of the Code allows a current deduction for certain losses that are
not compensated by insurance or otherwise.146 These deductions are
limited, however, to losses that are "evidenced by closed and com-
pleted transactions, fixed by identifiable events, and ...actually
sustained during the taxable year."'147 In order to obtain a deduction,
a party generally must suffer some sudden loss and not a gradual
deterioration.
48
IV. PRIOR STATEMENTS OF THE IRS ON DEDUCTIBILITY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION EXPENDITURES
In 1992 and 1993, the IRS issued several TAMs that dealt with
the deductibility of certain expenses from remediation of environ-
mental problems.149 These TAMs took an expansive view of the
long term benefits of environmental remediation and strongly sug-
gested that most remediation costs of hazardous substances would
be classified as capital expenditures. In 1994, however, the IRS
made a remarkable about-face. In Revenue Ruling 94-38, the IRS
issued an opinion holding that certain costs of remediating con-
taminated soil could be deducted. The Ruling was based on a
simplistic analysis of the reasons for and consequences of environ-
mental remediation activities. It suggested that in other contexts,
the IRS would be likely to hold that remediation costs would be
deductible as ordinary expenses. In 1995, however, the IRS seemed
to reverse course once again. A new TAM strongly suggests that
145. Id. at 1137.
146. I.R.C. § 165 (1994).
147. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) (as amended in 1977).
148. See, e.g., Fay v. Helvering, 120 F2d 253 (2d Cir. 1941); Rev. Rul. 72-592,
1972-2 C.B. 101 (casualty loss must be sudden, unexpected, and unusual).
149. Technical Advice Memoranda (TAM) are published by the IRS to resolve
disputed tax claims, but, like other private rulings, TAMs may not be used or cited as
precedent. I.R.C. § 61100)(3) (1988).
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the IRS believes that most remediation expenditures must be capi-
talized.1 0
A. Pre-1995 Technical Advice Memoranda
1. PCB Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004
In December 1992, the IRS issued a TAM holding that the
costs associated with a plan to remediate soil and equipment con-
taminated with polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") were capital
expenditures.1 5' The taxpayer's property had been contaminated with
PCBs from past operation of equipment, and from past efforts to
remove and dispose of the PCBs. The Environmental Protection
Agency instituted an enforcement action alleging violation of sev-
eral statutes including RCRA and the Toxic Substances Control Act
("TSCA"), 52 and, in settlement of the action, the taxpayer agreed
to an extensive plan to investigate and remediate PCB contamina-
tion on the taxpayer's property. The taxpayer had treated as current
expenses all of the costs of remediation, except for the costs of
equipment and groundwater monitoring wells.
The IRS held that the soil cleanup costs were capital expen-
ditures. 153 This conclusion was based on two factors. First, the
opinion held that the costs constituted "replacements and better-
ments", and not "incidental" repairs.1 54 Relying largely on Wolfsen
Land and Cattle Co.,1 55 the IRS found that the expenditures re-
sulted from the taxpayer's decision to forego regular maintenance,
that they were made as part of a systematic plan, and that they
would result in the property being more valuable. The opinion
specifically declined to follow the analysis in Plainfield-Union Water
Co. and strongly implied that the logic of Plainfield-Union had
150. See infra part IV.C.
151. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
152. See supra note 9.
153. The opinion also addressed the issue of whether legal fees, oversight, and
environmental audit costs are deductible. The opinion held that legal fees, incurred to
defend against actions by the government and private parties, were deductible expenses.
Oversight fees, incurred to monitor implementation of the PCB removal plan, were held
to be capital expenses. A recent TAM makes the continuing validity of this conclusion
questionable. See infra note 161.
154. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
155. See supra text accompanying note 104.
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been repudiated by Wolfsen.156 Second, the opinion relied on the
fact that the remediation was part of an overall plan for rehabili-
tation of the property.
157
2. Asbestos Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004
In 1992, the IRS issued TAM 92-40-004, which addressed the
deductibility of expenses to remove asbestos insulation.'58 In this
case, the taxpayer removed and replaced asbestos insulation in
certain manufacturing equipment. The taxpayer was concerned about
federal and state requirements relating to worker exposure to as-
bestos. Rather than institute a program to monitor and encapsulate
any friable asbestos insulation, the taxpayer elected to replace existing
asbestos insulation with new insulation that was less efficient.5 9
The taxpayer argued that the costs of asbestos removal should
be treated as deductible repairs since (1) the cost of the replace-
ment, although large, was minor in comparison to the facility's
overall repair and maintenance costs, (2) the expenditures did not
add value or prolong the life of the equipment but merely restored
the property to its original value and function, and (3) the expen-
ditures did not involve the types of expenditures typically treated
as capital since they did not create new units or components, and
were not part of a plan of rehabilitation. 60
The IRS held, however, that the expenditures were not repairs
but capital expenditures. The IRS relied on several factors: long-
term benefits to the company from reduced monitoring and main-
tenance costs, safer working conditions, reduced risk of liability
for owners and investors, increased marketability, permanence of
the improvement and the fact that the property now met local
requirements that allowed the business to continue in operation. In
the TAM, the IRS distinguished Plainfield-Union. In this case, the
IRS held that: one, there was no way to value the property prior
to the condition giving rise to the need for the repair; and two,
there was no decrease in efficiency as a result of the deterioration
that was being repaired. The IRS also noted that any increase in
156. Tech. Adv. Mern. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992); see also supra part III.B.1.
157. See supra part II.B.
158. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
159. Id.
160. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
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the value of the property resulted from "subjective factors" (such
as safer working conditions and increased marketability) that are
"not compatible with the objective measurement articulated in
Plainfield- Union." 161
3. Asbestos Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-11-002
TAM 94-11-002 dealt with expenses for the complete removal
of asbestos installation and the encapsulation of other friable as-
bestos installation. 62 In order to obtain a bank loan, the taxpayer
was required by the lender to remove or encapsulate asbestos con-
taining materials in the warehouse. The IRS held that the costs of
complete removal of the asbestos was a capital expenditure. Ac-
cording to the IRS, the complete removal produced long-term im-
provements since it: one, permanently eliminated health risks to
workers and potential lessees; two, made the property "more at-
tractive" to potential buyers, investors, lenders and customers; three,
expanded the useable area available to the taxpayer; and four,
adapted the property to a "new and different" use by allowing the
taxpayer to convert portions of its property into garage and office
space. 163
In contrast, the IRS held that the costs associated with encap-
sulation of asbestos were deductible repairs. Since these expenses
did not permanently remove the asbestos problem but merely ad-
dressed certain limited problem areas where asbestos insulation
was damaged or punctured, these expenses were in the nature of
"incidental repairs."' 164
B. Revenue Ruling 94-38
In 1994, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 94-38.165 At issue
were the costs incurred by a manufacturing facility in remediating
soil and groundwater contamination on its property. When pur-
chased by the taxpayer, the property was allegedly uncontaminated,
161. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
162. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-11-002 (Nov. 19, 1993).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
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but in over twenty years of operations the taxpayer had discharged
and buried wastes on portions of its land.
In 1993, in order to comply with "presently applicable and
reasonably anticipated federal, state and local environmental re-
quirements,' 1 66 the taxpayer began a remediation project that in-
volved removal and off-site disposal of contaminated soil and in-
stallation of groundwater monitoring and treatment systems. The
IRS claimed the effect of the remediation was to "restore [the] land
to essentially the same physical condition that existed prior to the
contamination.' 1 67 The IRS also noted that the taxpayer during and
after the remediation would use the land and operate the plant in
the same manner as it did prior to the cleanup. The only change
the IRS observed was that the taxpayer would now operate its
facility "in compliance with environmental requirements.' 1 68
Based on these facts, the Revenue Ruling held that most costs
of the remediation were currently deductible as ordinary expenses.
In a brief analysis, the ruling held that the remediation did not
produce any permanent improvements to the land. Citing Plainfield-
Union Water Co., the IRS stated that the relevant test for determin-
ing whether or not an expense was a permanent improvement was
to compare the status of the asset before the expense with the
condition of the asset before the event requiring the expenditure.
According to the IRS, the "soil remediation and ongoing ground-
water treatment expenditures do not result in improvements that
increase the value of [the taxpayer's] property because [the tax-
payer] has merely restored its soil and groundwater to their ap-
proximate condition before they were contaminated by X's manu-
facturing operations."'1 69 The Revenue Ruling held, however, that
the groundwater treatment facilities constructed as part of the re-
mediation had useful lives beyond the year in which they were
constructed, and were thus properly classified as expenses that





169. Id. at 36.
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C. 1995 Technical Advisory Memorandum 95-410-05
In September 1995 the IRS issued a memorandum that casts
further doubt on the deductibility of cleanup costs. TAM 95-410-05
implies that most costs associated with the cleanup of property
contaminated prior to purchase by the taxpayer must be capital-
ized.1 70 This TAM is difficult to interpret because the facts of the
case are so unclear.1 71 Apparently a corporate predecessor of the
taxpayer purchased undeveloped property that was used as a site
for the disposal of industrial wastes. The property may or may not
have been contaminated at the time of the purchase. Several years
after the purchase, the taxpayer donated the property to a county
government and took a charitable deduction for the donation based
on the fair market value of the property. After the county discov-
ered that the property was contaminated, it reconveyed the property
to the taxpayer for one dollar. The taxpayer recorded a new basis
in the property of one dollar and did not recapture or otherwise
take back income for any portion of the charitable deduction it had
previously taken. The property was subsequently investigated by
state and federal environmental officials and listed on the National
Priorities List under CERCLA. The taxpayer entered into a Con-
sent Decree with the Environmental Protection Agency and agreed
to perform a "Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study" ("RIIFS")
that, among other things, involved an investigation into the extent
of contamination and the development of plans for the cleanup of
the property.
Although the taxpayer had not yet incurred any costs for actual
remediation of the site, the taxpayer had incurred three classes of
expenditures: (1) costs to an environmental consultant for investi-
gation of the site and performance of the RIIFS, (2) legal fees
related to negotiation and drafting of the Consent Decree, and
3) fees paid to consultants for lobbying, public relations and some
engineering efforts. Based in large part on Revenue Ruling 94-38,
the taxpayer claimed each of these classes of expenditures as a
current deduction. Stating that capitalization was the norm, the IRS
rejected all of the claimed deductions holding that the taxpayer had
not met its burden of proof.
170. Tech. Adv. Mern. 95-410-05 (Sept. 27, 1995). See infra note 171.
171. See infra Author's Note following Conclusion.
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What emerges from the analysis of the TAM is that the IRS
is narrowly reading Revenue Ruling 94-38. The TAM suggests that
the IRS will allow the current deduction of cleanup expenditures
under the logic of 94-38 only if the taxpayer: acquired uncontami-
nated property; contaminated the property during his or her period
of ownership; expended money to restore the property during its
period of ownership; and restored the property to the uncontami-
nated condition that existed at the time it was acquired by the
taxpayer. In the TAM the IRS concluded that because the tax-
payer's expenditures involved remediation of contamination that
existed prior to its re-acquisition from the county, the expenses
were not deductible.1
72
The IRS appears to state that costs associated with the cleanup
of preexisting contamination must be capitalized. In a terse and
"lightly" reasoned paragraph, the IRS discusses the argument that
the hazardous waste site assessments costs may be deductible since
they relate to the subsequent cleanup of the site. 173 The TAM states:
Because we have concluded that the analysis in Rev. Rul. 94-38
does not apply to the Taxpayer, the actual cleanup costs, when
incurred, may be capitalizable improvements under section 263.
For costs incurred after December 31, 1986, section 263A
requires taxpayers to capitalize direct and certain indirect costs
associated with the production, including improvement of prop-
erty. See section 263A(g)(1) (emphasis added).
174
Note that there is no discussion of the significance of future
benefits and no discussion of case law such as American Bern-
172. It is unclear from the opinion whether use of the site as a disposal site began
before or after it was originally acquired by its corporate predecessor. If the contamination
began after the original acquisition, it is unclear whether the taxpayer could have
successfully relied on Revenue Ruling 94-38 if the reconveyance from the county had been
in the form of a rescission of the donation or if the taxpayer had revised its earlier taxes
to take back the value of the deduction.
173. In the TAM, the IRS specifically considered, and rejected, arguments that each
of the three classes of expenditures should be capitalized. Surprisingly, the TAM rejected
arguments that expenses incurred to avoid litigation may be capitalized. Although legal
fees are frequently deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses, the IRS
implied that attorney's fees incurred to facilitate a remediation must be capitalized. Since
there was documentation that the legal fees were incurred to negotiate and draft the
Consent Decree with the EPA, the IRS presumably concluded that such expenditures were
not deductible.
174. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-410-05 (Sept. 27, 1995).
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berg.175 The TAM informs the taxpayer that cleanup costs are to be
capitalized because they may be capitalizable, and the taxpayer has
not met its burden of proof to demonstrate otherwise. What one is
to make of this oddly written and reasoned TAM is unclear. The
implications of the TAM are further confused by the fact that it is
difficult to discern the weight that should be accorded to the TAM




Given the limited logic and inconsistencies in past IRS state-
ments, appropriate tax treatment of many remediation costs re-
mains uncertain. Remediation expenses can be incurred for a vari-
ety of different reasons and thus require a variety of different
responses. In many of the most common situations in which tax-
payers incur expenses, the inconsistent case law and varying ra-
tionales for classification of expenses make it difficult to determine
how remediation expenses should be classified. The following sec-
tion analyzes how remediation expenses might be treated when.
incurred in a variety of common situations.
A. Remediation of Contaminated Property by the Current
Landowner
1. Remediation of Contamination Caused by the Taxpayer
In many cases, federal and state law may require landowners
to remediate contamination of their property caused by the tax-
payer's activities. 177 If nothing else, Revenue Ruling 94-38 clarifies
that many of these expenses incurred to remediate contamination
caused by the taxpayer will be treated as ordinary expenses. 78
175. 10 T.C. 361 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1994).
176. I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3) (1988).
177. See supra part II.A.1.
178. Although not discussed in Revenue Ruling 94-38, the certainty of the conclu-
sion may be suspect if the remediation involves cleanup of pre-existing contamination or
the reduction of pollutants to levels below those existing at the time of purchase of the
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Thus, expenses incurred for investigating and planning remediation
activities and the costs of removal and disposal of contaminated
soil should be deductible as ordinary expenses in the year in which
economic performance occurs. Only expenditures made to con-
struct physical structures that last beyond the taxable year (such as
groundwater monitoring wells or pumping equipment) will be treated
as capital expenditures.
Under the logic of the Ruling, it seems irrelevant whether the
taxpayer incurred these costs in response to a government order or
voluntarily undertook the remediation to avoid future liability or
prepare the property for sale. The Ruling seems concerned only
with the facts that the taxpayer was restoring the property to its
preexisting condition and that the taxpayer was continuing to use
the property for the same purposes.
If the remediation expenses are made to clean up an immediate
spill of environmental pollutants, a much stronger argument can be
made that the expenses are a casualty loss to be treated under the
rules of section 165.179 This may be warranted if the liability is
confined to a discrete spill event for which the scope of liability
can be fixed and expenses for remediation incurred in the same tax
-ear as the event.
2. Remediation of Preexisting Contamination
If a taxpayer remediates contamination that existed at the time
of the property's purchase, neither Revenue Ruling 94-33 nor TAM
95-410-05 provide clear guidance on how the IRS will treat reme-
diation costs. Among other factors, the reasons the taxpayer in-
curred the expenses, the timing of when they were incurred and
even the extent of the remediation may affect their tax treatment.
The situation is even more complicated if the taxpayer does not
directly pay for the remediation but rather reimburses remediation
expenses incurred by other parties, such as the prior owners or
off-site generators liable under CERCLA, or has increased its costs
by waiving possible claims against a former owner.
property. In such cases, it is possible to conclude that the taxpayer is not simply repairing
but rather improving property and adapting it to new uses.
179. See supra text accompanying note 146.
[Vol. 20
1996] Tax Deduction of Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs 97
a. Remediation Expenses Directly Incurred by Taxpayer
If the taxpayer directly incurs costs to remediate preexisting
contamination, the situation differs markedly from the situation
analyzed in Revenue Ruling 94-38. To the extent that the remedia-
tion merely allows the taxpayer to continue operation of the facility
in the same manner as it had prior to the remediation, it is possible
to argue that Revenue Ruling 94-38 allows such maintenance ex-
penses to be treated as ordinary repairs. American Bemberg is
particularly relevant for this conclusion.1 80 In that case, payments
to fill in preexisting underground caverns that were causing surface
subsidence were allowed as repairs, in part because they merely
allowed continuation of the existing use.181
TAM 95-410-05, of course, expressly rejects application of
Revenue Ruling 94-38 in this context and strongly implies that
costs must be capitalized. The limited logic employed by the IRS
in TAM 95-410-05 and in the non-precedential status of TAMs
suggest, however, that the IRS may reconsider this issue in the
future.
There are many legitimate reasons to think that costs for re-
mediation of preexisting contamination must be capitalized. When
a taxpayer cleans up contamination that existed at the time of
purchase, the taxpayer is not simply restoring its own property to
some preexisting condition. Rather, the taxpayer is actually im-
proving the property's condition, which existed at the time of
purchase. Thus, such expenses might be considered improvements
subject to the normal rule of capitalization.
The situation is even more complicated if the remediation
results in attainment of pollutant levels that allow the property to
be used for new purposes. This would be the case if industrial
property were cleaned to levels that allow its use for residential
purposes. In such a case, it is far more likely that the expenses
could be treated as "permanent improvements or betterments made
to increase the value of any property or estate" under section
263.182
180. See supra text accompanying note 102.
181. The significance of American Bemberg may, however, be suspect in light of
Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-24-002 (June 17, 1994). See supra text accompanying note 116.
182. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-l(b). See supra part III.A.l.e. and LI.B.1.
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Additionally, if the remediation is taken as part of an overall
plan to address environmental problems at the site, it is possible
that these expenses would be treated as capital expenditures even
if they would have been deductible as ordinary expenses by the
prior owner.'83 Any cleanup undertaken by a buyer shortly after the
purchase, will raise questions as to whether the cleanup was part
of a plan of rehabilitation. If the remediation were considered part
of a plan of remediation, the expenses would presumably be capi-
talized by an adjustment to basis even if the same expenses, in-
curred in a situation that was not part of such a plan, might other-
wise be deductible. Similarly, remediation undertaken by a seller
before sale to increase the marketability of the property could also
be viewed as a capital expense under the plan of rehabilitation
doctrine. As noted above, determination of whether there is a plan
of rehabilitation is a fact specific inquiry made on a case-by-case
basis.8 4
b. Consideration of Remediation Expenses in the Purchase
Price: Waiver of Claims Against the Former Owner
It is not uncommon to identify environmental contamination
during an environmental audit and for the cleanup to be negotiated
as part of the transaction. To the extent that the negotiations result
in the buyer undertaking the remediation, those costs would likely
be treated as a part of the purchase price that must be added to
basis rather than deducted.
The buyer and seller may choose to negotiate a limitation on
the assertion of future claims against the seller for remediation
expenses incurred by the buyer after sale. These limitations will
apply even to claims arising from contamination that existed prior
to sale. In some cases, a purchaser may simply waive any CERCLA
or other claim it might have against a former owner. In other cases,
through caps on the total amount of money for which a seller may
be liable or through time limits on the assertion of claims, a pur-
chaser may limit the amount of money that it might otherwise have
recovered from the seller. In exchange for an agreement to limit
183. See supra part I.B.
184. Id.
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possible claims against the seller, the purchaser presumably will
pay a reduced price for the asset. 5'
Through such limitations, the purchaser is, in effect, assuming
the contingent liability of the seller. Thus, the purchaser's increased
remediation expenses might be viewed as a cost incurred as part
of the purchase of the property. Under case law dealing with as-
sumed contingent liabilities, such costs might be treated as capital
items that must be reflected in the basis of the property rather than
a deductible maintenance expense.
18 6
This issue is further complicated by the fact that the current
landowner may be jointly and severally liable with the former
landowner. In such a case, it might be argued that remediation
expenses paid by the purchaser are not an assumed contingent
liability since the purchaser, as current landowner, has the potential
liability even in the absence of the agreement.
c. Payments to PRPs Under CERCLA
In some cases, a landowner might be required to reimburse
other PRPs that clean up the taxpayer's property. 87 These reim-
bursement expenses would likely be treated as ordinary expenses
to the extent that they would have been treated as such if incurred
directly by the taxpayer. As with direct expenses, they may simply
restore the condition of the taxpayer's property. Also, as noted
above, the analysis in Revenue Ruling 94-38 does not seem to
185. In some cases, a purchaser may, as part of the negotiated sale of an asset, agree
not only to waive any claim that the purchaser had against the seller, but also to indemnify
the seller for any environmental cleanup costs which the seller may incur after sale. In
most cases, this indemnification will apply to costs incurred to remediate contamination
caused by the buyer after the sale, but in some cases the purchaser may agree to indemnify
the former owner for all costs incurred for contamination that existed even prior to sale.
Such an agreement might be reached where the seller wishes the equivalent of an "as is"
transaction in which, after sale, the seller has minimized its potential liability at the site.
Such an indemnification agreement could easily be treated as an assumption by the
purchaser of seller's contingent environmental liabilities. Thus, expenditures by the purchaser
to reimburse the seller for its subsequently incurred cleanup costs could be treated as part
of the cost of purchasing the property and thus require capitalization, rather than deduc-
tion, of the expenses paid to the former landowner.
186. See supra part III.B.3,4.
187. Under CERCLA, hazardous waste generators may be required to undertake a
cleanup at property they do not own, but at which they disposed of hazardous substances.
42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3) (1988). In such cases, they may seek to recover some of these costs
under CERCLA from the current landowner.
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depend on whether the costs were incurred voluntarily or through
government compulsion.
Payments to PRPs under CERCLA are not made as a result of
any express assumption of liability at the time of sale. Thus, curi-
ously, costs made by a landowner to reimburse former owners as
a result of a CERCLA cost recovery action are more likely to be
treated as deductible expenses than costs incurred as a result of an
indemnification agreement or limitation on recovery negotiated at
the time of sale.
B. Remedial Expenses Incurred by a Former Landowner
A previous landowner might currently be liable for the cost of
remediation of property in a number of ways. The former owner
may have incurred liability as part of the sale of the property if,
for example, the former owner agreed to indemnify the purchaser
for environmental liabilities. Additionally, the former owner may
be liable as a PRP under CERCLA or comparable state statute.
1. Expenses Incurred Pursuant to an Indemnification Agreement
Indemnification agreements negotiated as part of the sale of
real property frequently require the former owner to indemnify the
purchaser for costs incurred as part of the cleanup of the property.
In most cases, this indemnification is limited to expenses incurred
in remediating contamination that existed at the time of sale. De-
pending on the existing liability of the former owner under federal
or state law, such an indemnification can result in the seller either
retaining preexisting liability or incurring new liability. In either
case, the buyer presumably paid more for an asset in exchange for
the prospective indemnification by the seller.
If payments under an indemnification agreement are viewed as
the seller simply satisfying its preexisting liability, then it is un-
likely that they would constitute an element of the sales price of
the property or reflect any assumption of liability as part of the
sale. Nonetheless, the payment of retained liabilities still raises
difficult questions. Assuming the remediation expenses would have
been deductible if incurred when the seller owned the property, it
is likely they would be treated as an ordinary deductible expense
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when subsequently incurred. If, however, the expense would have
been capitalized as an improvement if made when the seller owned
the property, it is questionable whether it would similarly be capi-
talized if made when the seller no longer owns the property. The
expense could be viewed as an ordinary deductible business ex-
pense since the taxpayer is not obtaining a long-term benefit to an
identifiable asset. Alternatively, these payments might be capital-
ized and either (1) be treated as a capital loss available to offset
current capital gain, or (2) result in recalculation of the adjusted
gain or loss on the asset.
An indemnification by seller, even with respect to preexisting
contamination, could result in the seller incurring new liabilities.188
This is, curiously, the reverse of the typical assumption of contin-
gent liabilities issues. In such a case the seller is assuming contin-
gent liabilities of the buyer. It is quite possible that a seller who
received a higher sales price as a result of such an indemnification
agreement might be required to treat payments under that agree-
ment as a part of the sale. The payments therefore would be capital
expenses and the seller would presumably have to readjust the gain
or loss on the sale to reflect those payments. 18 9
2. Remedial Expenses Incurred as a PRP
If a former landowner is obligated to pay the remediation
expenses of other PRPs, it is likely that the expenses will be treated
in the same manner as expenses incurred by any other off-site
generator.9 0 Certainly, there is no long-term benefit to a particular
capital asset. If the liability is not incurred or retained as part of
the sale of the property, it need not require treatment as a capital
loss associated with the transaction.
188. Not all prior owners of land are potentially liable under CERCLA. Prior
owners are liable under CERCLA only if they owned the land "at the time of disposal:'
The scope of this liability is somewhat uncertain, see supra discussion, in note 17, but it
is not uncommon for sellers to agree to indemnify buyers for preexisting contamination
even if the seller would otherwise be liable after sale.
189. See Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952), Bradford v. Commis-
sioner, 233 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1956); Fox & Solomon, supra note 2.
190. See infra text accompanying note 196.
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C. Remedial Expenses Incurred by Off-Site Generators
A business may incur environmental remediation expenses un-
der CERCLA or comparable state laws191 to cleanup property to
which it sent its waste. In such cases, it can be argued that these
costs are business expenses deductible at the time of "economic
performance." Payments for remediation of property not owned by
the taxpayer does not result in any long-term benefit to a particular
asset of the taxpayer. Other benefits identified in the TAMs, such
as reduced long term maintenance, increased marketability or re-
duced tort liability, are also not clearly present.
There are, however, arguments suggesting that all or part of
the off-site expenses should be treated as capital expenses in the
year economic performance occurs. First, the IRS could argue that
the generator receives a long-term benefit by avoiding additional
liability to the government and private parties, thereby increasing
the marketability and value of a company. 192 This argument is sub-
stantially stronger if the off-site generator enters into a settlement
agreement in which it receives contribution protection from suits
by third-parties 93 and a covenant not to sue by the government. In
such a case it is even clearer that payments made result in some
long-term benefit. 1
94
If the IRS did wish to pursue that argument, there still remains
the fact that there is no specific asset against which to capitalize
the expenses. Yet taxpayers may be required to capitalize expenses
even when there is no underlying tangible asset to which the ex-
penses can be applied. This is Indopco 95 in its most frightening
form since there the Court held no specific, tangible asset need be
identified in order to classify an expenditure as a capital expense. 196
Thus, it is possible that generators could be required to capitalize
remediation expenses but not be allowed to recover those expenses
through amortization or depreciation. 97
191. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
192. See supra part IV.A.1.
193. See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (1988) (affording settling parties
protection from suits by other PRPs).
194. See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f) (1988) (requirements for settlements
and covenants not to sue under CERCLA).
195. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
196. Id. at 86-87.
197. It is possible, but not certain, that the provisions of I.R.C. § 197 would allow
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Additionally, even if the off-site expenses were generally viewed
as ordinary expenses, there is some question as to whether that
portion of the payment made to construct permanent equipment or
improvements should be treated as capital expenses. In Revenue
Ruling 94-38,198 the IRS determined that such equipment must be
capitalized, though other expenses could be deducted as ordinary
income.
This creates obvious problems. Parties who have incurred costs
in settling CERCLA liability must have information about the ul-
timate use of those funds to determine proper treatment of their
expenses. Presumably the taxpayer must capitalize that portion of
its remediation expenses that reflect the percentage of cleanup
expenses devoted to construction of permanent improvements. Al-
though payment to an approved qualified settlement fund may en-
sure that economic performance has occurred, payment to such an
account does not determine whether the expense should be treated
as ordinary or capital expenses. 199
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
It is obvious that the issue of deductibility of remediation
expenses remains uncertain. It is almost impossible to make a
rational assessment of the tax classification of remediation ex-
penses. The same expenses incurred by different parties may have
different tax treatment; expenses incurred as a result of different
obligations may have different tax treatment; and the tax treatment
may vary depending on the type of cleanup technology that is
selected.
This situation creates practical and policy problems. First, the
current state of the law makes it virtually impossible to make
reasonable determinations about the tax treatment of most common
remediation expenses, and the rulings of the IRS and the courts
have not provided a consistent basis on which to resolve the issue.
Part of the problem lies in the basic elements of tax analysis.
Classification of capital and ordinary expenses is inherently difficult,
the taxpayer to depreciate the expenses over a 15-year period as a covered intangible
expense. See supra note 63.
198. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
199. See discussion of qualified settlement fund, supra note 77.
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and many expenses can legitimately be analyzed in different ways
to reach conflicting results as seen in Plainfield-Union and Wolf-
sen.
20 0
Second, the general principles and policies that normally pro-
vide guidance in drawing the necessary distinctions simply may
not be appropriate in determining the classification of remediation
expenses. We may be asking the wrong questions if the issue boils
down to whether cleaning up dirt is more like a repair or improve-
ment. For example, payments by a former owner to remediate
property may be deductible if imposed through CERCLA but capi-
talized if imposed through an indemnification agreement. Cleanup
by a taxpayer that allows it to continue use of its property for
industrial purposes are more likely to be deductible than cleanups
to levels that allow future use as residential property. The inquiry
into such subtle distinctions promotes uncertainty, increases the
costs of analyzing and complying with tax requirements, and ulti-
mately benefits no one.
Third, the IRS's approach of issuing piecemeal rulings and
TAMs is making a bad situation worse. The TAMs and Revenue
Rulings are inconsistent and the strained logic that they employ
may have the effect of distorting the law in other areas.
Fourth, the tax treatment of cleanup expenses may perversely
influence the types of remediation that are undertaken. Revenue
Ruling 94-38,201 for example, holds that, in some cases, expenses
for permanent improvements such as pumps and wells must be
capitalized whereas remediation expenses that do not involve such
construction may be deducted as ordinary expenses. Such a ruling
might give tax advantages to incineration or off-site disposal of
wastes where on-site "pump and treat" or construction and main-
tenance of impermeable covers may be preferable. Typically, selec-
tion of an appropriate remedial plan involves balancing a variety
of technical and environmental facts; it seems inappropriate to have
tax consequences influence the decision.
Finally, tax rules may actually discourage remediation if, for
example, the plan of rehabilitation doctrine were to penalize land-
owners that remediate property immediately before or after a sale.
200. 39 T.C. 33 (1962) and 72 T.C. 1 (1979).
201. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
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It is time to adopt a clear and consistent rule that resolves the
tax treatment of remediation expenses.2 02 Such a rule should ideally
be easy to apply, consistent in its treatment of remediation ex-
penses, generally consistent with existing tax law on deductions
and, at a minimum, eliminate tax considerations from selection of
remediation objectives and techniques. A rule that promoted envi-
ronmentally responsible efforts should also be a national objective.
Most of these objectives can be attained by adoption of a
relatively simple approach to tax treatment of remediation expenses.
In general, the IRS, through adoption of a treasury regulation, or
Congress, through amendment to the Internal Revenue Code, should
adopt a provision of general applicability; such a provision should
provide for the deduction as ordinary expenses (in the year in
which economic performance occurs) of all costs that are incurred
to remediate hazardous substances or hazardous or solid wastes
under the requirements of federal and state laws or pursuant to
federal or state regulations that authorize the recovery of such
expenses from private parties.
In addition to a general standard of compliance with federal
and state environmental laws, such a provision should specifically
provide that remediation expenses are deductible if these costs:
(1) would be recoverable under section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA,
(2) are incurred to comply with corrective action obligations under
section 3004(u), 3008(h) of RCRA,
(3) are incurred to comply with the corrective action obligations
applicable to Underground Storage Tanks under section 9003 of
RCRA, or
(4) are incurred for remediation of petroleum, hazardous substances
or hazardous wastes under state laws comparable to CERCLA or
RCRA.
Expenses that do not meet these criteria would be judged under the
general approach currently being developed by the IRS. Most re-
202. Several industry and tax groups have submitted comments to the IRS on this
issue that, not surprisingly, suggest that most hazardous waste cleanup costs should be
immediately deductible. See Comments of the Tax Executives Institute, Inc. On the Proper
Income Tax Treatment of Environmental Remediation Expenditures Submitted to the
Internal Revenue Service, TAX NoTEs TODAY (June 23, 1993); Comments of Coopers &
Lybrand, TAX NOTES TODAY (June 22, 1993).
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mediation expenses that are incurred in an environmentally appro-
priate manner would, however, qualify for treatment as ordinary
expenses.
The advantages of such an approach are straightforward:
(1) This approach would provide certainty and consistency to the
tax treatment of remediation expenses. The rule would adopt by
reference an established body of law that would determine whether
an expense is deductible. If an expense for remediation of a haz-
ardous substance is incurred in a manner that is consistent with the
national contingency plan under CERCLA, it would be deductible.
If a party incurred costs pursuant to a corrective action order it
would be deductible.
(2) Selection of a cleanup standard and technique would not be
influenced by tax considerations. The tax treatment of expenses for
off-site disposal of wastes would be the same as for on-site treat-
ment and containment. Decisions would be made exclusively with
regard to the requirements of applicable environmental statutes.
(3) The tax treatment of comparable remediation expenses would
be the same regardless of who incurred the costs or the circum-
stances in which they incurred the costs. Thus, remediation ex-
penses of an off-site generator or a current owner of property
would be treated the same for tax purposes. This approach would
eliminate possible distinctions in tax treatment between payments
made under indemnification agreements as opposed to payments
made following CERCLA contribution or cost recovery actions. It
would also eliminate possible different treatment of cleanup ex-
penses that might be characterized as part of a plan of rehabilita-
tion.
Additionally, the Emerging Issues Task Force ("EITF') of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board had previously issued recommendations that provided for the deduction
of most remediation costs. See Capitalization of Costs to Treat Environmental Contami-
nation, EITF Bulletin 90-8 (Emerging Issues Task Force, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.,
May 31, 1990); Accounting for the Cost of Asbestos Removal, EITF Bulletin No. 89-13
(Oct. 26, 1989). EITF Bulletin 90-8, for example, recommends that environmental con-
tamination treatment costs should be treated as ordinary expense items unless (1) the costs
extend the life, increase the capacity, or improve the safety or efficiency of property owned
by the company, (2) the costs mitigate or prevent environmental contamination that has
yet to occur and that otherwise may result from future operations or activities or (3) the
costs are incurred in preparation for the sale of property currently held for sale.
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(4) Taxpayers would have an incentive to undertake remediation
in an environmentally appropriate manner in order to ensure that
the costs will be treated as ordinary expenses.
(5) Comprehensive treatment of this issue through regulation or
amendment could avoid the IRS's current approach of attempting
to address the unique issues associated with environmental reme-
diation by reference to existing regulations and analysis that is
simply inappropriate.
The disadvantages of the approach are also straightforward:
(1) This approach allows immediate deduction of certain expenses
that would be treated as capital expenditures under existing IRS
rulings. 203 The immediate deduction of these expenses would re-
duce the amount of tax revenue received by the government. As a
practical matter, such a rule would probably have little actual
impact on revenues. Given the current state of uncertainty and
vacillations by the IRS, most taxpayers may be confused, but they
are also probably deducting most remediation expenses .204 The pri-
mary impact would be from deduction of expenses for permanent
equipment that is probably now being amortized by most taxpay-
ers.
(2) The rule is not completely certain and consistent. There is
considerable confusion, for example, about the elements necessary
to ensure that a cleanup of hazardous substances is consistent with
the NCP.
(3) It may require the IRS to determine whether a cleanup is
consistent with environmental requirements before deciding whether
an expense is deductible.
(4) It may also require the IRS to determine which State laws are
comparable to CERCLA and RCRA. Although this is a concern,
the IRS in other contexts is required to assess whether taxpayer
expenses satisfy other legal requirements. Additionally, under the
current approach, the IRS needs to evaluate existing environmental
requirements if only to ascertain whether a remediation adapts
property to a new use.
203. For example, the groundwater equipment that must be capitalized under
Revenue Ruling 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35, would be deductible under this proposed approach.
204. See Comments of the Tax Executives Institute, supra note 201.
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(5) The approach does not resolve all issues relating to environ-
mental expenses. The asbestos TAMs, for example, involved ex-
penses that were probably not covered by the proposal. The tax
treatment of a vast amount of expenses would be covered by the
proposal, and any expenses not addressed by the proposal would
simply be analyzed under the same approach that is currently used.
Questions might exist as to the authority of the IRS to adopt
such a regulation. Although the IRS has broad rulemaking author-
ity to adopt necessary regulations, 2 5 there would certainly be some
question as to whether such a generic regulation is consistent with
the Code.206 Section 162(a), however, authorizes the deduction of
"ordinary and necessary business expenses. '207 Given the inherent
ambiguities in the classification of remediation expenses and the
apparent willingness of the IRS to conclude that remediation of
property has limited long-term benefits to the taxpayer, such a rule
is justifiable. Although not free from doubt, such a rule could be
seen as promoting a fundamental objective of the Code-matching
tax treatment of expenses to the year in which the benefit occurs.
In fact there may be only two objections by the IRS to the
adoption of such a regulation. First, to the extent that the regulation
would authorize the immediate deduction of physical equipment
with useful lives that extend beyond the taxable year, the rule
might be seen as inconsistent with § 263A.208 However, it seems at
best ambiguous as to whether construction of physical equipment
as part of a remediation program necessarily constitutes "produc-
tion" of property in a trade or business.
209
Second, the rule gives special tax treatment to expenses in-
curred in compliance with certain environmental statutes. Since the
205. I.R.C. § 7805 (1994) authorizes the IRS to "prescribe all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be
necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue."
206. Although IRS regulations must be within the authority of the Code, courts have
generally been deferential in reviewing the validity of IRS regulations. See National
Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979); Commissioner v. South Tex.
Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948). The Supreme Court has, of course, articulated a general
rule of deference to administrative interpretation of statutes. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
207. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988).
208. I.R.C. § 263A (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
209. At worst, the IRS could authorize deduction of all other expenses and require
amortization of physical equipment.
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IRS should be making tax, and not environmental policy, this dis-
tinction may seem anomalous. The effect of the regulation, how-
ever, would be to create a "safe harbor" for those taxpayers who
incur expenses in compliance with the statutes. Other taxpayers
would simply be required to justify deductions under traditional
tax theories. Given the advantages of certainty in the tax treatment
of these expenses, the regulation seems justifiable independent of
any environmental advantages.
Nothing, of course, prevents Congress from amending the In-
ternal Revenue Code to adopt such a provision. Certainly the Code
is littered with special provisions, including, for example, section
468, that gives special treatment to payments to reserve funds for
remediation by solid waste management facilities.210
Consistency, certainty and appropriate environmental remedia-
tion seem ample justifications for a clarifying amendment.
Evaluation of this proposal ultimately requires a comparison
with the status quo. Given the problems with the current approach,
the proposal with its limitations may be preferable.
VII. CONCLUSION
Enormous amounts of money are spent annually in the United
States on remediation of environmental contamination. Despite the
magnitude of these expenses, the IRS has not yet been able to
develop a consistent and logical approach for determining whether
the expenses are ordinary or capital expenditures. Indeed, there are
inherent problems in classifying environmental remediation ex-
penses under traditional approaches that distinguish ordinary from
capital expenses. In addition, the IRS has advanced differing and
inconsistent approaches in various rulings it has issued. The uncer-
tain state of the law is producing both bad tax and bad environ-
mental policy. It is time for the IRS or Congress to resolve this
problem by adopting provisions that ensure consistent, simple and
environmentally beneficial treatment of remediation expenses.
210. I.R.C. § 468 (1994). See also supra note 76.
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Author's Note
The IRS recently revoked and reversed TAM 95-410-05. See
96 TAX NOTES TODAY 13-3 (Jan. 19, 1996). Concluding that the
contamination was solely the result of the Taxpayer's activities, the
IRS held that Taxpayer's costs were deductible under the logic of
Rev. Rul. 94-38. The status of expenditures to clean up pre-exist-
ing contamination remains uncertain. See supra part IV.C.
